本文围绕穿透式监管理念开展研究，主要阐述了穿透式监管的理论基础和国内实践，着重分析了国际和国内债券市场在穿透式监管方面的差异。我国在穿透式监管方面既要求对投资者进行身份识别，也要求对交易活动的资金端、资产端以及资金流向进行穿透。我国债券市场基础设施在设计之初即以系统安全、信息集中穿透为设计理念，通过中央确权、一级账户、直接持有等制度予以实现。与国际实践相比，我国债券市场直接持有体系更能从根本上体现穿透式监管的核心特征，即提高市场透明度和实质重于形式。我国债券市场基础设施在落实穿透式监管方面具有主动性，在时效性、真实性以及信息全面性等方面都具有较强优势，能够有效降低监管成本。

我国穿透式监管理念的提出

从我国债券市场发展历程来看，早在1995年政府债券簿记系统设计之初，即体现了“穿透”的导向。1981年，我国恢复国债发行，但当时并未形成与之配套的制度规范，也未设立统一的登记托管结算机构，出现了虚假托管、挪用投资者债券、债务拖欠严重等市场乱象。种种乱象的根源是我国债券市场分散托管的实践，而分散托管也使得监管机构难以及时获得准确的债券投资者信息及交易信息，不透明的市场为一些参与者实施违法行为提供了“天然屏障”。为根治债券市场乱象，我国政府债券簿记系统在建设之初即在顶层设计中明确采用集中托管体系和进行信息集中穿透。坚持集中托管能够满足国债托管系统高安全性的要求，坚持信息集中穿透能够使监管机构及时掌握市场动态变化。基于这样的系统建设目标和要求，我国债券市场形成了中央登记托管结算体系，并通过一级账户结构予以践行。而安全、信息集中穿透的系统设计目标正是穿透式监管的价值追求和目的所在。

当前，穿透式监管理念已广泛应用于金融监管领域，并上升至对金融改革的整体要求。2017年召开的全国金融工作会议提出，要坚持从我国国情出发推进金融监管体制改革，增强金融监管协调的权威性、有效性，强化金融监管的专业性、统一性、穿透性，所有金融业务都要纳入监管，及时有效识别和化解风险。

随着穿透式监管理念的不断深化，该理念已在多个领域得到践行。在证券市场，监管机构要求中介机构对异常股东“层层穿透核查到最终持有人”，以加强上市公司股东信息披露1。在资管领域提出按照穿透原则计算单只产品的总资产，并对资产管理业务实施穿透式监管，做到向上识别产品的最终投资者，向下识别产品的底层资产2。在财政领域，财政部发布《地方政府债券发行管理办法》（财库〔2020〕43号），明确提出地方政府债券在全国银行间债券市场（商业银行柜台市场除外）、证券交易所债券市场均实行一级托管，各类投资者直接在登记托管机构开立债券账户，实施穿透式管理；在地方政府专项债领域，财政部发布《地方政府专项债券项目资金绩效管理办法》（财预〔2021〕61号），提出利用信息化手段对专项债券项目实行穿透式监管3，将债券资金的使用及项目专项收入纳入监测范围，将监管重点从资金端延伸到项目端，专门搭建直达资金监控系统，对直达资金实行穿透式全流程监控4。由此可见，穿透式监管作为一种监管理念，已在财政、金融等多个领域得到践行，在财政资金高效使用、完善公司治理、金融市场投资者权益保护等多个方面都发挥了重要作用。

穿透式监管理念的内涵

（一）穿透式监管的界定

在我国，穿透式监管作为一种监管理念被提出，并未在立法层面明确其内涵，而是在一些规则中使用了“穿透”的原则。例如，证监会2014年发布的《私募投资基金监督管理暂行办法》在进行私募基金合格投资者资格的认定和人数的计算时，要求通过“穿透核查”的方式，穿透至最终投资者5。

纵观国际实践，“穿透”并不是确定的法律概念，多指一种技术手段或规范内容，不必然与监管发生关联。例如1998年美国证券交易委员会（SEC）对《1940年投资顾问法》（Investment Advisers Act of 1940）修正案进行解释说明时，在投资顾问服务的客户数量计算时使用了“look through”的表述，要求在计算投资顾问服务的客户数量时，应“穿透”法律实体，将每一个权益所有人作为合格客户进行计算。

目前，不论是从我国还是国际实践来看，都未能在立法中对穿透式监管作出明确界定。现行规则或立法说明中所使用的“穿透”强调了一种穿透核查或计算的方法，体现了立法机关的规制态度，即在对某一行为作出限制性规定时，不仅关注行为在外观上的合法性，更强调在行为实质上的合法，避免市场参与者通过形式上的“合法”掩盖实际突破限制性规定的行为。而由此衍生出的穿透式监管即具有这样的应然内涵——刺破外观形式发现金融活动的本质。就金融市场监管来看，穿透式监管应当包含穿透和监管两个维度：一方面，从穿透的角度看，穿透式监管的主要目的在于提高市场透明度；另一方面，从监管方式的角度看，穿透式监管的核心原则在于尊重实质重于形式。

（二）穿透式监管的理论基础

一般认为，穿透式监管以功能监管和行为监管为理论基础。简单来说，功能监管是按照金融交易行为的功能和金融产品的性质，对所有金融活动进行分类监管的模式。在金融机构混业经营的背景下，这种监管模式能够减少机构监管带来的监管真空、监管重叠和监管套利等现象。行为监管包含审慎监管和行为监管两个维度，学界一般称为“双峰”理论6：一方面，要求对金融机构进行审慎监管，防范和化解系统性风险；另一方面，将金融机构对金融公众投资者权益保护的实现程度作为对金融机构行为合法性审查的标准，维护金融市场的公正、透明，维持金融公众投资者对金融市场参与的信心。

穿透式监管可作为前述两种监管方式实施的重要手段，发挥基础性作用。穿透能够对事物的实质进行准确甄别，进而对行为的实质施以恰当的监管方式——或为功能监管，或为行为监管。

当前金融机构混业经营趋势明显，且金融产品层层嵌套，产品外观往往与行为本质具有实质性差异。因此，在对金融活动施以有效监管前，需要首先穿透识别监管对象的实质，在明确监管对象实质的前提下，实现监管措施的精准发力，为功能监管或行为监管的有效发挥奠定良好的基础。同时，穿透式监管作为功能监管和行为监管的重要手段和前提条件，其适用范围更加广泛。从监管对象范围来看，功能监管和行为监管主要围绕金融机构及其金融产品或业务而展开，极少涉及金融机构以外的市场参与者。但就穿透式监管而言，其既包括产品穿透，也包括主体穿透和嵌套层级穿透等。其中，主体穿透涉及金融机构及非金融机构的市场参与者，例如证券发行人、控股股东和相关投资者的穿透。总之，穿透式监管更侧重于识别监管对象的实质，作为一种监管理念提出，目的在于提高市场透明度，从而达到防范金融风险的监管要求。

（三）穿透式监管的价值取向

效率与安全一直是在金融市场中长期博弈的价值选择，而金融风险和金融危机频发且对世界经济造成严重损害，使人们呼唤金融安全。以提高市场透明度为核心的穿透式监管在此背景下被各国监管者所关注，既穿透市场参与者，也穿透金融产品。采用穿透式监管可以使监管者看穿市场参与者实质，同时保障包括金融投资者知情权在内的合法权益，提高市场透明度，以实现金融安全的价值目标。

穿透式监管是遵循安全价值的创新监管理念。当前我国金融市场监管的价值宜以安全价值为先。2020年《中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和二〇三五年远景目标的建议》发布，强调要维护金融安全，守住不发生系统性风险底线；要完善现代金融监管体系，提高金融监管透明度和法治化水平，健全金融风险预防、预警、处置、问责制度体系。2021年《政府工作报告》提出，要强化国家经济安全保障，并将金融安全战略与粮食安全战略、能源资源安全战略并列，作为国家经济安全保障的重要方面单独列出，足见金融安全的重要性。因此，应在保障金融市场安全与稳定的前提下，实现金融活动创新和金融市场活跃。安全优先的价值取向要求金融领域的穿透式监管足够深入，不但要实现对资金全过程的穿透式监管，还应涉及金融市场参与主体适当性及其行为合规性的穿透识别。

穿透式监管的境外实践

如前文所述，穿透式监管并不是明确的法律概念，其最早作为一种对行为实质的规制理念出现在法律规则中。例如，美国在《1940年投资公司法》（Investment Company Act of 1940）中对投资公司受益人的人数作出限制性规定。据此，在审核投资公司受益人人数时，面对具有一定决策能力（10%以上投票权）的公司股东，需穿透公司法人独立主体的外观，将公司实际股东人数计入受益人范畴。该规定并没有出现“穿透”的字样，但已体现出穿透的理念。在美国金融危机对全球造成破坏性影响的背景下，基于金融安全需求而提出的穿透式监管理念得到世界范围内的认可。

（一）国际证监会组织

2008年国际金融危机后，国际证监会组织（IOSCO）和各国监管机构认识到穿透式监管的必要性，开始提出提高市场透明度、识别客户和交易行为等具体的监管要求。其中，交易透明度即在实时基础上公布交易前和交易后信息的程度。2013年4月，IOSCO二级市场监管委员会（C2）发布题为《有效的市场合规和监管工具面临的技术挑战》（Technological Challenges to Effective Market Surveillance Issues and Regulatory Tools）的研究报告，其中第四条建议中提到“客户识别，即市场监管机构应当有能力在每一笔订单和交易过程中识别相应的客户和参与人”。

（二）巴塞尔委员会

在国际统一监管层面，巴塞尔委员会将“穿透方法”（Look-through Approach）引入集合投资风险暴露、计算资产证券化风险权重以及大额风险暴露等领域。其具体规定，在集合投资风险暴露计算中，通过穿透投资资产池的风险暴露计算集合投资的风险；在资产证券化架构中，通过穿透识别资产池内各项标的资产的信用质量计算无评级证券化资产的风险权重；在大额风险暴露中，通过获悉标的资产的来源，穿透至资产的潜在交易对手方，根据其是否属于同一或者是相关联的交易对手方计算银行面对单一交易对手方的大额风险暴露。

（三）美国

2012年，美国SEC通过了第613条规则。该规则要求创建全面的合并审计跟踪系统“CAT”（Consolidated Audit Trail），使监管机构能够高效准确地跟踪在美国国家市场体系中所有的证券市场活动，包括数据的收集及向中央存储库报告数据。受2014年美国国债现货市场流动性冲击影响，2016年SEC批准美国金融业监管局的一项规则提案，要求其成员向交易报告与合规系统（TRACE）汇报特定类型的国债交易，由此提高了监管机构了解和监控美国国债市场活动的能力。此外，由于美国债券市场的多级托管和名义持有制度，中央托管机构无法穿透掌握国债持有者的底层数据，2017年美国财政部建议，经纪人平台在其向监管部门提供的国债交易报告中应识别自营交易公司（PTFs）的身份，以获取更加详细的交易数据，推动国债交易报告制度的完善。2021年，美国金融业监管局就美国国债市场交易报告制度征求意见，征求意见稿中提出要规定更详细的交易执行时间点、缩短报告周期、增加报告指标、增加用于识别交易是否依照当前市场定价的符号、标准化价格报告以及单独报告每笔交易的另类交易系统（ATS）费用等。

（四）欧盟

2015年，欧盟汲取了金融危机监管不力、市场不透明的教训，发布了《关于证券融资交易和再适用透明度的法案》，以期提高证券融资市场和金融体系透明度。该法案规定，证券交易方应在任何证券融资交易达成、变更或终止的一个工作日内，向指定的交易报告库上报相关信息，再由其报送给相应金融监管部门。2017年欧洲证券和市场管理局（ESMA）发布了修订的《金融工具市场指令》（MiFID Ⅱ），要求所有市场参与者和基础设施运营者均要配合提交交易报告，落实全球法人机构识别编码（LEI）的相关要求，以促进交易透明化。

（五）英国

英国金融行为监管局（FCA）发布的《关于通过互联网众筹及通过其他媒介发行非易于变现证券的监管方法：对于CP13/13的反馈说明及最终规则》中就有涉及穿透式监管的规定。该规则确立了对点对点（P2P）网络借贷进行监管的基本原则和方法，建立了七项基本监管规则。监管当局要求所有P2P网络借贷平台必须明确告知消费者其商业模式及延期或违约贷款评估方式等信息，同时网站和贷款的细节被纳入监管，平台要定期向FCA报告相关审慎经营状况和财务状况、客户资金情况、客户投诉情况、上一季度贷款信息等。

（六）明讯银行

在国际中央证券托管机构层面，卢森堡明讯银行（CBL）在其风险防控制度中指出间接持有和多级托管模式可能存在的风险，要求参与者在开立隔离账户时，应当向其披露客户身份信息。在开立综合账户混合几个客户的资产时，要求综合账户中任何单一收益不得超过托管在该账户资产总价值的25%。当单一收益超过限额时，要求参与者将相应资产分离到客户隔离账户。此外，CBL定期收集参与者客户的一般信息，以履行其“了解你的客户”的义务。

（七）小结：境外穿透式监管的局限性

在2008年国际金融危机之后，各国监管机构就建立穿透式监管机制的必要性形成广泛共识。但由于境外长期采用间接持有和多级托管模式，对投资者身份、交易的实时监控并不具备基础，其在实践中通过数据收集报送等多种方式实现穿透式监管。国际上穿透式监管主要体现在两个方面：一是对投资者的识别，即对市场参与主体的穿透；二是对金融交易活动信息的被动报送，即对市场交易活动的穿透。

这些制度都是在间接持有制度基础上建立的旨在提高市场透明度的具体实践，具有现实价值。但在进行穿透式监管过程中，这些制度存在一定的局限性，具体包括：一是时效性较差，对于实时信息的获取具有滞后性；二是真实性较差，依靠金融机构自行报送信息存在信息造假的可能性；三是信息全面性较差，如欧盟采用的LEI码并未实现所有投资者全覆盖，因而无法实现全面的穿透式监管；四是监管成本较高，如欧盟虽然在建设证券融资交易报告库，但是基于分散的交易报告库，监管部门仍然无法掌握投资者的最终信息，同时每日报送交易信息也增加了市场机构和监管部门的成本。有英国学者提出，从长远角度出发，直接持有制度是解决间接持有模式下监管效果被稀释问题最为直接有效的方式。

我国债券市场穿透式监管的实践

（一）以安全、信息集中穿透为设计目标构建我国债券市场基础设施

我国在债券市场化探索之初因缺少必要的监管机制，导致债券市场“野蛮生长”。例如，在“327”国债期货事件中，万国证券开出1460亿元的空单，而对应现货产品的发行总量仅为240亿元。正是由于托管不集中导致信息不集中，管理部门无法穿透掌握交易数量、交易结构的实时动态变化，造成监管空白、风险管理失效，发生债券市场风险事件。

基于此，管理部门意识到国债市场基础设施的重要性，决定构建集中、统一的债券市场登记托管结算体系。我国在政府债券簿记系统项目建设过程中强化顶层设计，坚持集中托管和信息集中穿透，坚持从实际情况出发，既不照搬西方成熟市场方案，也避免粗犷式设计，明确系统设计和建设尽可能与我国债券市场长远发展相适应的理念，避免“327”国债期货风波和国债回购风波等类似事件再次发生，保障我国债券市场的安全、高效、稳定。

（二）中央确权、一级账户、直接持有是有效落实穿透式监管的制度安排

我国政府债券簿记系统在具体的制度安排上确立了一级账户体系，债券市场投资者直接在系统中开立账户，形成投资者与发行人之间的直接持有结构，排除了托管机构参与的间接持有模式下挪用投资者托管债券的风险。虽然当时我国相关法律制度准备不足，但我国坚定推动金融改革的决心不动摇，坚持建设中国特色、国际先进的金融基础设施体系的初心不动摇，才形成了现行先进、安全、高效的中央债券登记托管结算体系。

仅设立金融市场基础设施并不一定能够有效落实穿透式监管的要求，只有基于科学有效的制度安排才能在金融市场基础设施健全的条件下实现监管目标。2005年，某证券公司利用混同账户在交易所市场挪用托管在自身席下的客户账户，终因先后挪用4.77亿元客户保证金和债券资产造成重大损失。当时，证券经营机构挪用客户债券资产、违规进行国债回购等风险事件频发，暴露了客户资产保护的薄弱环节。此后，管理部门在交易所市场融资融券、沪港通、深港通等制度设计中，均采纳了穿透式监管理念。与此类似，美国是较早建立中央托管机构的国家，但不穿透的账户结构、不透明的托管体系也引发了风险问题。2008年，雷曼公司在破产前以挪用的托管客户资产作为担保向银行获取授信，导致托管客户损失，加剧了破产处置的混乱局面，最终导致由美国房地产泡沫和金融衍生工具杠杆所引发的金融危机在全球蔓延。由此可见，金融市场基础设施应辅以必要的穿透识别制度安排，这样才能有效发挥金融市场基础设施应有的作用。

与境外一些国家基于多级托管、间接持有制度安排而补充设计的穿透式监管要求相比，我国在债券市场基础设施制度设计之初即确立了中央确权、一级账户、直接持有制度，通过该制度安排，监管机构能够通过中央债券登记托管结算机构及时、准确、全面地获取债券市场发行、交易、结算的实时动态信息，且监管成本最低，有效避免了境外补充式穿透监管的弊端。我国债券市场金融基础设施在落实穿透式监管方面具有主动性优势，在时效性、真实性以及信息全面性方面都具有较强优势，还能够有效降低监管成本。

（三）债券市场基础设施的业务创新能够使穿透式监管进一步深化

债券市场基础设施作为市场运行的核心支撑，在业务开展过程中能够主动落实穿透式监管理念：一方面，通过自身业务的有序运行，维护债券市场的透明度和稳定性；另一方面，能够为监管者提供必要且准确的信息，为监管者进行监管决策提供有力支持。我国金融基础设施作为重要的金融市场参与主体，在有效发挥自身职能的同时与时俱进，依据市场发展需求不断创新业务模式，以发展的理念完善穿透式监管。在我国债券市场不断开放的政策背景下，中央结算公司确立“中央确权、穿透监管、多级服务、合作共赢”的理念，通过充分掌握境内外债券市场投资者情况，及时识别债券市场可能存在的风险或不利因素，为监管决策服务，维护我国债券市场的安全与稳定。这不仅是在微观层面落实穿透式监管的理念，更为宏观监管政策的制定提供了有力支持。（本文为中央结算公司中债研发中心“债券市场登记托管结算问题研究”课题的部分研究成果）

注：

1.中国证券监督管理委员会2021年2月9日发布的《监管规则适用指引——关于申请首发上市企业股东信息披露》规定：发行人股东的股权架构为两层以上且为无实际经营业务的公司或有限合伙企业的，如该股东入股交易价格明显异常，中介机构应当对该股东层层穿透核查到最终持有人，说明是否存在本指引第一项、第二项的情形；最终持有人为自然人的，发行人应当说明自然人基本情况。

2.《人民银行  银保监会  证监会  外汇局关于规范金融机构资产管理业务的指导意见》（银发〔2018〕106号）第二十七条提出：实行穿透式监管，对于多层嵌套资产管理产品，向上识别产品的最终投资者，向下识别产品的底层资产（公募证券投资基金除外）。

3.《地方政府专项债券项目资金绩效管理办法》第十四条规定：财政部门利用信息化手段探索对专项债券项目实行穿透式监管，根据工作需要组织对专项债券项目建设运营等情况开展现场检查，及时纠偏纠错。

4.参见2021年5月24日中国政府网发布的文章《财政直达资金使用效果好》。

5.《私募投资基金监督管理暂行办法》（中国证券监督管理委员会令第105号）第十三条规定：以合伙企业、契约等非法人形式，通过汇集多数投资者的资金直接或者间接投资于私募基金的，私募基金管理人或者私募基金销售机构应当穿透核查最终投资者是否为合格投资者，并合并计算投资者人数；但符合本条第（一）、（二）、（四）项规定的投资者投资私募基金的，不再穿透核查最终投资者是否为合格投资者和合并计算投资者人数。

6.“双峰”理论由英国经济学家泰勒于1995年提出，该理论要求监管主体在对金融市场实施监管时，应关注于金融系统的稳定（即审慎监管）和保障公众投资者权益（即行为监管）。

参考文献

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[2]苟文均. 穿透式监管与资产管理[J]. 中国金融，2017(8):17-20.

[3]郭文栋. 行为监管与金融公众投资者保护探析[N]. 金融时报，2016-12-19(01).

[4]吴弘，胡伟. 市场监管法论——市场监管法的基础理论与基本制度[M].北京:北京大学出版社，2006:162.

[5]辛积金，张雯，杨天骄. 国际“穿透式”监管理论的发展和实践对我国的启示[J]. 西部金融，2018(02):65.

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[7]Louise Gullifer, Jennifer Payne. Intermediation and Beyond[M]. Hart Publishing, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc,2019：382-408.

Look-through Regulation: Theoretical and Practical View

Zhang Wen, Qi Chang

Abstract: Centered on studying the principle of look-through regulation, this article expounds the theoretical basis of look-through regulation and how it is applied in China, with a focus on analyzing the differences in look-through regulation between international and the Chinese bond markets. China’s look-through regulation requires investor identity verification as well as look-through of the funds, assets and fund flows of trading activities. When China’s bond market infrastructure was first conceived, system security and centralized look-through information was taken into its design, which was enabled by centralized registration of ownership, segregated accounts and direct holding. Compared to international practices, the direct holding system of China's bond market can better reflect the core characteristics of look-through regulation on a fundamental basis, i.e., increased market transparency and substance over form. China’s bond market infrastructure has been proactive in implementing look-through regulation. It offers timely, authentic and comprehensive information, and effectively lowers regulatory costs.

Keywords: Look-through regulation  FMI  Financial security

Introduction of the look-through principle in China

A review of the history of China’s bond market shows that the “look-through” approach was already reflected in the government bond book-entry system when it was first conceived in 1995. When China resumed government bond issuance in 1981, market chaos, including false custody, misappropriation of investors’ bonds and significant debt defaults, ensued because the corresponding institutional arrangements and a central securities depository and settlement institution had not yet been in place. These chaos stemmed from decentralized depository, which prevented regulators from obtaining timely and accurate information on investors and transactions. The lack of market transparency provided a “natural shield” for the illegal conduct of some participants. To eradicate such chaos, a centralized depository system and look-through management of information were adopted in the master design at the initial stage of developing China’s government bond book-entry system. Centralized depository ensures security of the government bond custody system, and centralized look-through management of information enables regulators to keep track of market information. In this way, a central securities depository and settlement system took shape in China's bond market, and was implemented via a segregated account structure. To ensure security and centralized look-through management of information is precisely what underlies look-through regulation.

Today, the look-through principle is widely applied in financial regulation, and is now an overall requirement for the financial reform. The 2017 National Financial Work Conference proposed to proceed with financial regulatory system reform while taking China’s actual conditions into consideration, enhance the effectiveness of regulatory coordination, strengthen the professionalism, uniformity and look-through approach, and all financial services must be subject to regulation so that risk may be promptly and effectively identified and resolved.

The look-through principle has so far gone around into multiple fields. In the securities market, regulators require intermediaries to “look through each tier to the ultimate holder” of unusual shareholders to enhance information disclosure of listed company shareholders1. In asset management, it is proposed that the look-through principle be adopted to determine the total assets of each product, and look-through regulation applied for the asset management business, so that both the ultimate investors and the underlying assets of the product may be identified2. At the fiscal level, the Administrative Measures for the Issuance of Local Government Bonds (Caiku [2002] No. 43) issued by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) expressly proposed that direct holding of local government bonds be implemented in the national interbank bond market (excluding the commercial bank counter market) and the exchanges; investors must open bond accounts directly with the depository institution, and look-through management must be implemented. For special local government bonds, the Measures for the Administration of Fund Performance of Special Local Government Bonds (Caiyu [2021] No. 61) issued by MOF proposed the use of information-based measures to carry out look-through regulation for special bonds3. This entails bringing the use of bond proceeds and income from the underlying projects into supervision, extending regulatory priorities from funds to the projects, and establishing a direct fund monitoring system so that the entire look-through monitoring process may be carried out4. As a regulatory principle therefore, look-through regulation has already been implemented in many fiscal and financial scenarios. It plays a key role in facilitating efficient use of fiscal funds, corporate governance and investor protection.

Implications of the look-through regulation principle

(1) Definition

In China, look-through regulation has been proposed as a regulatory principle and adopted in regulatory rules, while not defined at the legislative level. For instance, the Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Privately Offered Investment Funds issued by CSRC in 2014 requires that “look-through verification” be implemented to the ultimate investor5 when identifying the status of qualified investors and determining the number of investors for private equity funds.

An overview of international practices reveals that “look-through” is not a defined legal concept. It refers more to a technical means or normative content, not necessarily connected to regulation. For instance, when the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) amended the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 in 1998, the expression “look through” was used in the explanatory notes for the calculation of the number of clients served by the investment adviser. Specifically, advisers are required to “look through” the legal entity to get to each beneficial owner as a qualified client.

At present, both Chinese and international practices show that no distinct definition for look-through regulation has been stated in legislation. “Look through” used in prevailing regulatory or legislative explanations stresses a look through verification or method of calculation, reflecting the regulatory attitude of legislative organs. In other words, when restricting a particular conduct, the emphasis is more on the legal nature of the conduct so that market participants are prevented from using “legal” formalities to cover up infringements of restrictions. As a result, look-through regulation has such inevitable implications, which pierces the facade so as to unearth the nature of the financial activity. In respect of financial market regulation, look-through regulation should include the two dimensions of look-through and regulation: from the look-through perspective, the primary objective is to improve transparency; from the perspective of regulatory method, the core principle is to place substance over form.

(2) Theoretical basis

It is generally believed that functional regulation and behavioral supervision are the theoretical bases of look-through regulation. Simply put, functional regulation refers to the implementation of differentiated regulation for all financial activities based on the functions of financial trading and the nature of the financial products. Given the mix of business operations in a financial institution, this regulatory model can reduce regulatory vacuum, overlap and arbitrage brought about by institution-based regulation. Behavioral supervision includes prudential regulation and conduct supervision, generally referred to as the “twin peaks” theory by the academic circle6: On the one hand, financial institutions need to be put under prudential regulation, so as to prevent systemic risks; on the other hand, the extent of investor protection provided by the financial institutions is taken as a benchmark for compliance so as to protect market fairness and transparency, as well as to maintain the confidence of investors in financial market participation.

Look-through regulation can serve as an important means for implementing the two aforesaid regulatory methods, playing a fundamental role. Look-through gets to and work on the substance, and applies the proper regulatory methods, functional or  behavioral, to the substance of financial activities.

At present, mixed business is a distinct trend among financial institutions, and financial products are becoming more structurally complicated. There is often substantive differences between a product’s external packaging and the underlying trading behaviors. Therefore, prior to implementing effective regulation on financial activities, a look-through identification of the underlying nature must be carried out, which could be a basis for ensuring effectiveness of the functional or behavioral regulation measures. Meanwhile, as an important means and the precondition of both functional and behavioral regulation, look-through regulation has a broader scope of application. In terms of regulatory targets, functional regulation and behavioral supervision are carried out primarily on financial institutions and their products or services, with little involvement of market participants other than financial institutions. Look-through regulation, however, includes both product look-through as well as entity look-through and structure look-through. In particular, looking through entities involves non-financial institutions, such as securities issuers, controlling shareholders and relevant investors. In sum, the emphasis of look-through regulation tends toward identifying the substance of the regulatory target, and is proposed as a regulatory principle to enhance market transparency, so as to facilitate risk management.

(3) Value orientation

Efficiency and security have been two priorities to choose and to balance. In face of frequent financial risks and crises, security is sought for by more and more. It is in this context that look-through regulation, centered on improving market transparency, has become the focus of regulators around the world. This approach looks through both market participants and financial products. Adopting look-through regulation can help regulators see through market participants, protect rights and interests including investors’ right to be well-informed, and improve market transparency so as to achieve financial security.

Look-through regulation is an innovative regulatory principle that values security, which is also a preferred priority for China’s financial market at present. The Proposals for Formulating the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) for National Economic and Social Development and the Long-Range Objectives Through the Year 2035, released in 2020, stressed the need to ensure financial security, and prevent systemic risks; to improve the modern financial regulatory system, increase financial regulatory transparency and the rule of law, and enhance financial risk prevention, warning and handling as well as the accountability system. The 2021 Government Work Report called for the enhancement of national economic security, and placed the financial security strategy on a par with strategies for safeguarding food and energy resources. The singling out of the financial security strategy as a key aspect highlights the importance of financial security. Hence, financial innovation and market activity should be achieved under the premise of security and stability. The “safety first” value orientation demands that look-through regulation in the financial sector must be deep enough. Not only should look-through regulation be applied to capital on a full-process basis, but also be used to identify whether financial market participants are qualified and whether their behaviors are compliant.

Look-through regulation: overseas practices

As described earlier, look-through regulation is not a defined legal concept. It first appeared in legal rules as a regulatory idea for the essence of conduct. For example, in the Investment Company Act of 1940, the US made provisions for limiting the number of beneficiaries in an investment company. Accordingly, when reviewing the number of beneficiaries of an investment company, in respect of a company shareholder with decision-making capacity (holding more than 10% of voting securities), the independent legal person entity of the company will be subject to a look-through, and the number of actual shareholders of the company be calculated as beneficiaries. The term “look-through” was not seen, but the principle was adopted. Given the devastating global impact of the US financial crisis, the look-through principle was proposed and accepted worldwide in pursuit of financial security.

(1) International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO）

Following the 2008 global financial crisis, the IOSCO and regulators worldwide recognized the necessity of look-through regulation, and began to propose specific regulatory requirements to increase market transparency, and to identify clients and trading behaviors. In particular, transparency refers to the extent to which pre- and post-trade information is disclosed on a real-time basis. In April 2013, the Committee on Regulation of Secondary Markets (C2) published a consultation report entitled Technological Challenges to Effective Market Surveillance Issues and Regulatory Tools. Recommendation 4 in the report mentioned that “client identification, i.e., for each trade and in the process of trading, regulators should have the capacity to identity the corresponding client and participant”.

(2) The Basel Committee

At the level of unified international regulation, the Basel Committee has introduced the “Look-through Approach” in the areas of collective investment risk exposure, calculating asset securitization risk weighting, and large exposures. Specifically, collective investment risk exposure is determined by applying the look-through approach to the underlying asset pool. In terms of asset securitization, the look-through approach is applied to identify the credit quality of each underlying asset in the asset pool to determine the risk weighting of securitized assets without a rating. In terms of large exposures, through obtaining the source of the underlying assets, the look-through approach is applied to the potential counterparty of the asset; a bank’s large exposure to a single counterparty is determined based on whether it belongs to an identical counterparty or a group of connected counterparties.

(3) USA

In 2012, the US SEC adopted Rule 613, which requires the creation of a comprehensive consolidated audit trail that would allow regulators to efficiently and accurately track all activity throughout the U.S. Markets in National Market System (NMS) securities, including the collection of data and the reporting of the data to a central depository. As a result of the 2014 liquidity shock in the US treasury cash market, the SEC approved an amendment to a rule proposed by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in 2016, which requires that its members report transactions in eligible securities to the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), so as to enhance the capacity of regulators to better understand and control activities in the US treasury bond market. Elsewhere, given the multi-tiered custody and nominal holding system in the US bond market, central securities depositories do not have access to the underlying data of Treasury bond holders. In 2017, the US Department of the Treasury proposed that broker platforms must identify Principal Trade Firms (PTFs) when providing treasury trade reports to the regulators so that trade data with greater detail may be obtained, thus improving the trade reporting system for treasury bonds. In 2021, FINRA, in the draft pertaining to request for comments on the US bond market trade reporting system, proposed rules for: providing more details on the time of trade executions, shortening the reporting cycle, adding reporting indicators, increasing the number of symbols used to identify whether trades adhere to prevailing market pricing, standardizing price reporting, and the alternative trading system (ATS) fee for reporting each trade separately.

(4) EU

In 2015, the EU, learning from the lessons (lax supervision, non-transparent market) during the financial crisis, published the Regulation on Transparency of Securities Financing Transactions and of Reuse in order to increase transparency in the securities financing market and the financial system. The regulation stipulates that counterparties to securities financing transactions (SFTs) must report the details of any SFT they have concluded, as well as any modification or termination no later than the working day following the conclusion, modification or termination of the transaction to a central database, which will then submit the same report to the corresponding financial regulator. In 2017, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) released the amended Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) requiring all market participants and infrastructure operators to submit transaction reports. The relevant requirements of the Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) must be implemented to promote transaction transparency.

(5) UK

Rules related to look-through regulation can be found in the Regulatory approach to crowdfunding over the internet, and the promotion of non-readily realisable securities by other media: Feedback to CP13/13 and final rules released by the Financial Conduct Authority. The regulation established the basic principles and methods for regulating online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, and set up seven basic regulatory rules. The regulators require that all P2P online lending platforms must provide consumers with appropriate information about their business model and the way in which loans are assessed as being in late payment or default. The website and details of loans are subject to FCA rules. The platforms must regularly reports to FCA concerning their prudential operating condition and financial position, client money held, customer complaints and details of loans arranged each quarter.

(6) Clearstream

At the level of ICSDs, Clearstream Banking Luxembourg (CBL) has indicated in its risk control system the potential risks that may exist in indirect holdings and in the multi-tiered custody services. When opening a segregated account, CBL requires that the participant disclose the identity of the underlying client. When opening an omnibus account where the assets of several of its underlying clients are comingled, CBL requires that no single interest in the client omnibus account should exceed 25% of the total value of assets deposited on that account over time as represented by its direct customer. When the single interest exceeds the limit, the participant is required to separate the corresponding asset into a client segregated account. In addition, CBL collects general information of participating clients to perform its KYC obligation.

(7) Summary: Limitations of look-through practices in the overseas market

Following the 2008 financial crisis, regulators worldwide reached widespread consensus on the necessity for establishing a look-through regulatory mechanism. However, as countries outside China have long adopted an indirect holding and a multi-tiered custodian model, they do not have the basis for real-time monitoring of investor identity and trade. Look-through regulation is achieved in practice through data collection and other methods. Internationally, look-through regulation is primarily reflected in two areas. First, investor identification, i.e., look through of market participants; and second, passive submission of information pertaining to financial trading activities, i.e., look through of trading activities.

These policies are concrete practices built on the institutional foundation of indirect holding aimed at increasing market transparency, and has practical value. However, in the process of implementing look-through regulation, these policies have certain limitations. These include: 1) Poor timeliness, i.e., lags in obtaining real-time information. 2) Poor authenticity, i.e., relying on a financial institution to report information on its own may lead to information fraud. 3) Limited coverage; for example, not all investors in the EU have LEI, which makes it impossible for look-through regulation to achieve full coverage. 4) High regulatory cost; for example, although the EU has established SFT databases, these are fragmented. Therefore, the regulators still do not have access to the final information of investors. In addition, daily submissions of transaction information have increased the costs of market institutions and regulators. UK scholars have pointed out that the direct holding system is a direct and an effective method of addressing the dilution of regulatory effect under the indirect holding model from a longer term perspective.

Look-through regulation practices in China’s bond market

(1) Building China’s bond market infrastructure with security and centralized look-through information as objectives

At the initial stages of exploring bond marketization, the lack of appropriate regulatory mechanisms led to “barbaric growth” in the bond market. For example, in the “327” government bond futures incident, Wanguo Securities held a short position worth RMB146 billion, but the corresponding bonds issued were worth just RMB24 billion. Decentralized depository led to information fragmentation that the regulators were unable to look through and gain access to transaction volume and real-time changes in transaction structure. This in turn resulted in a regulatory vacuum and risk management failure, and the bond market risk event ensued.

As such, the regulators recognized the importance of government bond market infrastructure, and decided to establish a centralized securities depository and settlement system. In the process of building the government bond book-entry system, China has strengthened top-level design, persisted in centralized depository and centralized look-through information, and adhered to the actual situation. It did not imitate the schemes of matured Western markets, and avoided coarse design. It specified that system design and construction should, as far as possible, fit the long-term development of the domestic bond market, preventing the recurrence of incidents similar to the “327” government bond futures incident and government bond repo crisis. This ensured the security, efficiency and stability of China’s bond market.

(2) Centralized registration of ownership, segregated accounts and direct holding are effective institutional arrangements for look-through regulation

China’s government bond book-entry system has established a direct holding system based on specific institutional arrangements. Bond market investors open accounts directly in the system, creating a direct holding structure between investors and issuers. This helps prevent the risk of misappropriation of investors’ bonds under custody. Although China’s relevant laws and regulations were not fully ready at the time, the nation decided to firmly push ahead with financial reforms. Its original intention to build an internationally advanced FMI with Chinese characteristics remained resolute. This was how the current secure and efficient central bond depository and settlement system was created.

Setting up a FMI alone may not be enough. Regulatory goals can only be achieved under sound FMI conditions based on proper and effective institutional arrangements. In 2005, a securities company took advantage of an omnibus account to misappropriate clients’ assets on the exchange market. A total of RMB477 million of margin and bonds was misappropriated, inflicting severe damage. At the time, frequent occurrences of risk events such as securities firms misappropriating the bond assets of clients, and conducting illegal government bond repos exposed a weak link in the protection of clients’ assets. Thereafter, the regulators adopted the look-through principle when designing systems and policies for on-exchange financing, Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect, and Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect. Likewise, the US was one of the first countries to establish central depositories, but the lack of a look-through account structure and a transparent depository system led to risk events. In 2008, Lehman, prior to bankruptcy, misappropriated clients’ assets under custody to serve as collateral for bank loans, resulting in losses for its clients. This exacerbated the chaos in bankruptcy disposition. The US real estate bubble and leveraged financial derivatives finally triggered a global financial crisis. This tells us that FMI must be supplemented with the necessary institutional arrangements for look-through identification. Only then can FMIs play an effective role.

Compared with some of the overseas institutional arrangements that are based on multi-tiered custody and indirect holding but supplemented with look-through regulatory requirements, China, at the time the design of its bond market infrastructure was first conceived, had already established a direct holding system. Through the institutional arrangements, regulators are able to promptly, accurately and comprehensively obtain real-time information on issuance, trading and settlement through the central bond depository and settlement institution. In this way, the regulatory costs are minimized and defects of using the look-through approach as a supplement are avoided. China’s bond market FMI has proactive advantages in the implementation of look-through regulation, as it facilitates timely and authentic full information collection.

(3) Innovations in the operations of the bond market infrastructure can further deepen look-through regulation

As a core pillar of market operation, bond market infrastructure has been able to proactively implement the look-through principle in the business process. On the one hand, the orderly operation of its own business safeguards the transparency and stability of the bond market. On the other hand, it provides necessary and accurate information to regulators to help with decision making. As a key financial market participant, China’s FMI has effectively leveraged its own functions and kept pace with the times. It has continued to innovate its business model to cope with market developments, and has improved look-through regulation accordingly. In the context of ongoing opening-up of China’s bond market, CCDC’s principle of “centralized registration of ownership, look-through supervision, multi-tiered services and win-win cooperation” has promptly identified the risks or unfavorable factors that may exist in the bond market by fully mastering investor conditions in the domestic and overseas bond markets, serving regulatory decision-making, and safeguarding the security and stability of China’s bond market. This not only implements look-through regulation at the micro level, but also provides strong support for formulating macro regulatory policies.

(This article is part of the research findings of the “Study on Securities Depository and Settlement Issues in the Bond Market” undertaken by CCDC Research and Development Center.)

Notes:

1. The Guidelines for Application of Regulatory Rules - Disclosure of Information on Shareholders of Companies Applying for IPO released by the China Securities Regulatory Commission on February 9, 2021 prescribe that: In the event that an offering shareholder has a shareholding structure of two tiers or more, and is a company or limited partnership without any actual business operation, if the transaction price for the purchase of an equity stake by the said shareholder is distinctly unusual, the intermediary is required to look through each tier to the ultimate holder, and state whether Articles 1 and 2 of the Guideline herein exists. If the ultimate holder is a natural person, the issuer should present a basic profile of the natural person.

2. Article 27 of the Guiding Opinions of the People’s Bank of China, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Regulating the Asset Management Business of Financial Institutions (Yinfa [2018] No. 106) prescribes that: Look-through regulation should be applied. For multi-tiered structured asset management products, both the ultimate investor(s) of the product and the underlying asset(s) (excluding publicly offered securities investment fund) must be identified.

3. Article 14 of the Measures for the Administration of Fund Performance of Special Local Government Bonds prescribes that: The public finance departments should use information-based measures to explore the application of look-through regulation on special bond projects, as well as conduct on-site inspection of the construction and operation of special bond funded projects, if necessary, and remedy errors promptly.

4. Please refer to the article Direct fiscal funds are effective, dated May 24, 2021, published on www.gov.cn.

5. Article 13 of the Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Privately Offered Investment Funds (CSRC Decree No. 105) prescribes that: In respect of non-legal person entities such as those in the form of partnerships or agreements that directly or indirectly invest in private equity by pooling the funds multiple investors, the private equity manager or private equity sales institution should apply look-through verification to the ultimate investor to ascertain whether the said investor is qualified, and calculate the number of investors on a consolidated basis. However, such look-through verification and investor calculation do not apply to investors that comply with Clauses (1), (2) and (4) of the Article herein..

6. The “twin peaks” theory was proposed by UK economist Tyler in 1995. It calls for regulators to pay attention to financial system stability (i.e., prudential regulation) and safeguarding the rights and interests of investors (i.e., conduct regulation) when regulators regulate the financial markets.

Authors from: CCDC Research & Development Center

Editors in charge: Yin Ying, Liu Ying